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All our readings are misreadings (spoken at Vanderbilt Univer­
sity, 1989), 
I try to write the question: (what is) meaning to say? Therefore it 
is necessary in such a space, and guided by such a question, that 
writing literally mean nothing. Not that it is absurd in the way that 
absurdity has always been in solidarity with metaphysical mean­
ing. It simply tempts itself, tenders itself, attempts to keep itself 
at the point of the exhaustion of meaning. To risk meaning 
nothing is to start to play, and fltst enter into the play of 
differance which prevents any word, any concept, any major 
enunciation from coming to summarize and to govern from the 
theological presence of a center the movement and textual 
spacing of differences .. , this 'meaning-to-say-nothing' is not, 
you will agree, the most assured of exercises. 
'Thought' ... means nothing: it is the substantified void of a 
highly deri vative ideality, the effect of a differance of forces, the 
illusory autonomy of a discourse or consciousness whose 
hypostasis is to be deconstrocted, whose 'causality' is Lo be 
analyzed, etc .... Whatever will continue to be called thought, and 
Which, for example, will designate the deconstruction of 
logocentrism, means nothing, for in the last analysis it no longer 
derives from 'meaning.' Wherever it operates, 'thought' means 
nothing (P, pp. 14,49). 
In broaching your question. you also noted that I meant some­
thing and that, even ifyou did not understand it completely, you 
were convinced of my wanting-to-say-something. I am less sure 
of this than you (Wood, p. 89). 
We should note that Derrida's saying is not "some of our readings 
are misreadings," nor "our readings tend to be misreadings," but the 
universal, all-inclusive assertion, "all our readings are misreadings." What 
we have here is not a difficulty in communication but absence of commu­
nication, and not a difficulty to be dealt with and minimized but an absence 
never to be encroached upon, a gap never to be narrowed. 
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To use the metaphor of a gun, itisn't "all OUI firings are misses" but 
"all our firings are misfirings," i.e. the gun does not go off. When we read, 
the hammer hits the head of the bullet but there is only a "click." Derrida is 
dealing with more than the inevitability of misinterpretations or an anarchy 
ofperspectivism in the handling oftexts (though he is saying those things). 
In this paper, I would like to attempt: 
(1) An identification of who Derrida is and what he is doing. In 
this section, I will seek to show that Derrida and his work 
constitute a sign of the meaninglessness or nothingness that 
lies just beneath the surface of existence, that his role is 
philosophical. 
(2) An illustration ofDerrida' sdeliberate "misreadings" of texts, 
how Derrida responds when he is misread, and briefly how 
deconstrnction is playing a role in the literary community (a 
look at Stanley Fish) in dealing with texts. 
(3) A call for an appreciation and qualified inclusion ofDerrida 
in textual interpretation. 
I. Who Is Jacques Derrida? 
By this, I do not mean things like his being an Algerian Jew who came to 
France when he was nineteen, but who is he in terms of his philosophical/ 
literary impact on the world? For that, I know ofno better starting place than 
the address Derrida gave in 1968 in Paris called simply, "Difjerance." I 
purposely come to the text for his own voice, the record of his own words, 
so as much as possible to let his speech identify him. He begins by saying, 
I will speak:, therefore,ofaletter. Ofthef"rrstIetter, if thealphabet, 
and most of the speculations which have ventured into it, are to 
bebelieved. I will speak, therefore, ofthe letter a, this initial letter 
which it apparently has been necessary to insinuate, here and 
there into the writing of the word difference... 
Nowithappens, I would say in effect, that this graphic difference 
(a instead of e), this marked difference between two apparently 
vocal notations between two vowels, remains purely graphic: it 
is read, or it is written, but it cannot be heard (MP, pp. 3-4). 
Derrida continues by saying that thepresence ofthe letter a inits capital form 
(A) is compared in shape to an Egyptian pyramid in Hegel's Encyclopedia 
so that it remains "silent, secret, and discreet as a tomb" and "not far from 
announcing the death of the tyrant" (MP. p. 4). The fact that a and e cannot 
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be differentiated in the last syllable of differ(ela)nce when spoken but only 
when written or read show us there is a "silence" in "so-called phonetic 
writing," a failure to convey difference, and consequently, (according to 
Derrida) "there is no phonetic writing." 
In logic, Derrida's argument is a blatant fallacy-the error of 
generalizing from an exception (a and e being indistinguishable in sound in 
a particular word is used to conclude that all letters fail to denote distinct 
sounds). Most of the time letters do a very good job of distinguishing and 
differentiating sounds and that is why phonics are used in spe1ling in spite 
ofall the exceptions. BuUfwereacted this way and rejected Derrlda' swords 
as nonsense, we would be extremely unimagInative and philosophically 
dull. 
What if one were to begin with Nietzschean meaninglessness and 
decide to use that which is most pretentious in the conveyance of mean­
ings-Le., words-as an effigy of the non-existent Word (considered 
philosophically or theologically), an effigy not to be burned but dismantled 
(deconstructed) in order to signify the end ofmeaning? What lfthe death of 
God and Truth in Heavenis followed by the death of Man and truth on Earth? 
What if philosophy's debunking of Plato's Big Meanings undercuts the 
integrity ofall little and ordinary meanings? If one were to take a word, then, 
like difference, and observe what happens when the e becomes an a, listen 
to the failure of a textto carry Ufe, significant sound distinguishing one letter 
from another, one feels the instability of words and wonders about other 
losses inherent with language. Derrida is understandable in these terms as 
a philosopher making an effigy oflanguage-disrupting and deconstructing 
it-to protest the Silence in the universe, a Silence ready to quake under 
every word like a city built on a fauIt line. 
Who is Jacques Derrida? He is that indeterminate sound, that 
flickering between the e and the a, that silent and open space between the r 
and the n of differ_nce which disrupts the e, x' s itout, makes it a space, then 
an a, then a space, then ane, and from then on the e and all texluality is never 
the same. When Derrida speaks in conventional, linguistic terms (though 
always tentatively), the e is at work. When Derrida exists in movement as 
space to introduce the a, he is disruption, ever-changing, Heraclitean 
energy, intervention, and play. When Derrida operates as the a, he uses 
words to undercut words ("writing" means "nothing") and metaphysics to 
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undercut metaphysics ('''thought' means nothing"). Consequently, with the 
energy and change characteristic ofDerrida. it is difficult when questioning 
him or reading his texts to know ifhe Is the e (saying the tentative sayable), 
the space (disrupting the sayable), or the a (using the sayable to point to the 
Unsayable). 
Derrida exists, then, as a philosophical sign. He is the flickering a 
behind the e reminding us of the tentativeness, the thinness of all human 
meanings andof the deep silence just below. HeistheA as Egyptian pyramid 
announcing the death of the tyrant which is all the language ever spoken­
language which promised us The Truth, The Word, The Meaning of the 
Universe commandeered directly or indirectly by God or Man at the center. 
There is no ground and no center, and Derrida exists to undermine and 
unsettle, to "clean house" with respect to Western metaphysics. 
He resists identifying himself because he is against the very pre­
sumption of classification and naming. He resists the tombstone existence 
of concepts buried within words. So, we can save ourselves time by not 
asking him who heis. Ifwe want to know who he is we must (ironically) try 
not to misread him. Ifhe intends or means anything in all this movement, it 
is, "Play, for Nothingness is with us and at the door." 
Derrida as the Flickering A is playful and so playful that even 
sympathizers are sometimes embarrassed with his antics. John Llewelyn in 
his Derrida on the Threshold ofSense says that what Rorty and others find 
so shocking about Derrida is his "multilingual puns, joke etymologies. 
allusions from anywhere, and phOnic and typographical gimmicks" (p. 114). 
(Frankly, I am surprised at Llewelyn because in that same book he refers to 
something Derrida considers a fallacy in Freud's thinking but uses the 
spelling, p-h-a-l-l-u-s-y, without any quotation marks to clarify ifLlewelyn 
or Derrida is "fooling around" here.) 
Why does Derrida refuse the label of "negative theology" and all 
other labels? Because he refuses the Western metaphysical constructs in 
which a11language is enmeshed, because he refuses the pegging ofmeaning, 
the confidence of thought or meaning existing Of having a happy transmis­
sion in words. Derrida says, 
To be very schematic I would say that the difficulty of defining 
and therefore also oftmnslating the word 'deconstruction' stems 
from the fact that all the predicates, all the defining concepts, all 
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the lexical significations, and even the syntactic articulations, 
whicb seem at one moment to lend themselves to this definition 
or to that translation, are also deconstructed or deconstructible, 
directly or otherwise, etc. And that goes for the word, the very 
unity of the word deconstruction, as for every word. 
Consequently, Derrida also says, 
All sentences ofthe type 'deconstruction is X' or 'deconstruction 
is not X' a priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at 
least false (Wood, p. 4). 
Again, I think there is a blatant problem with what Derrida is saying 
on a literalleve1. Obviously, both deconstruction and Derrida come to us 
through words, concepts, assertions, etc. Here is someone who works to 
keep himself (as he says) on the outer edge of "the exhaustion of meaning," 
but nonetheless, without thought and its conveyance through words there 
would be no deconstruction and no Derrida, so it begs the question to act as 
ifDerrida can never be conceptualized. Ifhe spoke only gibberish, he would 
have been escorted to an asylum and we would be reading someone else. 
The play does have a feel of negative theology, though, much like 
the Israelites who in the absence of a Moses on the mount receiving the Word 
of God make a golden calf (a fiction), engorge themselves with food, then 
rise up "to play." There is a real sense ofrecess from absolutes and eternal 
values feltin Derrida' s textual play. There is an anti-metaphysical largeness 
and expansiveness to his "fooling" with texts, an equivocation and playful 
disguise, that would have echoed well in Zarathustra's cave. 
It is interesting to note as well that when Demda writes to aJapanese 
friend who is looking for a suitable translation for "deconstruction," he 
speaks of dictionary definitions such as "disarranging the construction of' 
and "to disassemble the parts of a whole." He also traces the history of 
deconstruction as a reaction to structuralism, "an antistructurallst gesture," 
even a "demolition" of any confidence in language as it stands tied to 
Western metaphysiCS. So Derrida does not entirel y dispense with words to 
define deconstruction. (He knows how to don the disguise ofthe tentative e.) 
II. Derrida And Misreadings 
Among the proponents of deconstruction there is an effort to 
minimize any adverse impact Derrida might have with "hands on" textual 
interpretation because there are those who feel that Derrida could wreak 
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havoc with his "all our readings are misreadings" and his textual nihilism. 
First of all, it seems to me that people like Stanley Fish with his "Is there a 
Text in this Class?" really do raise the spectre ofliterary communities acting 
out a Derridean, anti-metaphysical, nihilistic approach to texts. When we 
read Fish and he says "that the notions of 'same' or 'different' texts are 
fictions" (p. 169), that "perspectival perception is all there is" (p. 365), and 
that "no reading, however outlandish it might appear, is inherently an 
impossible one" (p. 347), we see the Flickering A and hear Derrida's 
laughter (p. 169). Fish does not believe there are accurate or proper readings 
oftexts, but that the reader (and ultimately the literary institution) arbitrarily 
gives or assigns the text its meaning. (The only check on "arbitrary" is the 
voice of the literary community.) Here the text is not the final reference to 
evaluate readings. Interpretations will change and evolve as the community 
changes with the passage of time. Meaning is not transcendental or fixed: 
"Heaven and Earth" will pass away, and so will today's interpretation. 
Derrida himselfhas no hesitation in misreading a text and assigning 
it the meaning he wants it to have. For example, I laughed when I first read 
Derrida's statement that "for Nietzsche 'the great principal activity is 
unconscious(ness)'" and that "all of Nietzsche's thought" is "a critique of 
philosophy as an active indifference to difference" (MP, p. 17). The great 
principal activity for Nietzsche is the Will to Power, and the only one for 
whom the critique of philosophy must be for its indifference to difference 
is Derrida-not Nietzsche. But then again, did not Heidegger in his book 
on Nietzsche give us more of Heidegger than Nietzsche and before that did 
not Nietzsche usurp David Hume's work by saying in Twilight o/the Idols. 
"I was the first to formulate... that there are no moral facts?" Derrida seems 
to be operating faithfully within a tradition. After all if perspectivism is aU 
there is (and Nietzsche did say that) why not impose our perspecti ve (textual 
violence) very forthrightly and unapologetically upon everything we read 
and represent? Where all is seeming and nothing is real, why should we care 
about maintaining the integrity ofwhat someone else has written-espeeiall y 
if we do not think that what someone else has written is objectively 
decipherable to begin with? 
But we do mind when we are misread by others, even Derrida 
minds. Michael Fischer in Does Deconstruction Make Any Difference? 
mentions the irony ofDerrida' s feeling misread by John Searle in a literary 
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critiqueofDerrida. Derrida says things like "by ignoring this orthat moment 
of the text" and refers to Searle's "autistic representation" and obliterating 
contexts (p. 40). In the real world where texts do have an objectivity that 
minds can subjectively apprehend, people feel hurt when "justice" is not 
done to their text. (In Irene Harvey's book on Derrida, she apologizes to 
Derrida-though she is herself a deconstructionist-for any failure to do 
justice to his texts.) This is worlds away from both Derrida's and Fish's 
tentativeness about language and textuality-theinevitability ofmisreadings. 
If misreadings are the rule and not the exception, why should Derrida be 
upset and Harvey apologize? Is not their behavior here a tacit adherence to 
both the possibility and desirability of accurate textual readings? Meaning­
lessness at the center of the universe is fine to talk about when we are dealing 
with someone else' s texts but whenit comes to our own, suddenly itbecomes 
important to believe that there is a ground and center for discussion: we 
become logocentric when it is our logos at the center. 
III. A Can For Inclusion 
Finally, I would like to suggest, in what might seem to be a 
contractiction of all that I have said heretofore, how I think Derrida should 
be included in our approach to the interpretation of texts. Needless to say. 
Derrida is wilh us to stay. His presence as what I have called the Flickering 
A is as symbolic and important for philosophylIiterature as Socrates the 
gadfly who, ill a sense, went about "deconstructing" everyone's claims to 
wisdom, and Heraclitus for whom all reality is disruption and change. 
That Derrida exists as a sign means that he is not to be taken as a 
standard or literary method for interpretation. As Joseph Margolis says, 
deconstruction is "not a canon of procedures or criteria for testing the 
adequacy ofprocedures for interpreting texts or for assessing the cognitive 
fit between interpretation and text..." (Margolis, p. 148). When Isaiah 
walked around naked for 3 years as a sign of Israel's coming captivity, his 
action was not intended as a dress code for his time. Derrida is asign for the 
implications of there being no God in the universe, no Word behind all 
human words, no Text written in Nature or Scripture which in some way 
supports all human textuality. 
Positively speaking, in literary interpretation where Derrida oper­
ates as a sign we are less likely to feel we have nailed down any and all 
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possibiUties arising from a text's meaning. We will watch for the Flickering 
A, the unsaid and unsayable behind a text, the meanings that fall through the 
cracks or get lost through the structure. The Flickering A makes us respect 
the element of surprise and helps us resist the tendency to capitulate to the 
"letter that kills." Life has movement, surprise, and disguise to it, and 
nothing is more deadly than the tendency in classrooms to simply "crank 
out" textbook interpretations that leave both teacher and student cold. 
With these qualifications of Derrida's role, I think his inclusion to 
the literary community is significant and worthwhile. 
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